Military Theory of Ancient Warfare

Continuing the theme of the past several weeks, I would like to again make my knowledge available for writers and other interested parties. In this case, I’d like to begin a discussion of ancient warfare. War features prominently in many fantasy and historical fiction books, but an authentic rendition of ancient warfare is rare. I’m more of an armchair historian and military theorist than an expert, but I do have some knowledge to share. Essentially, I read a lot of books about this stuff, and will try to distill what I have learned as best I can. Furthermore, as much as I would like to cite my claims, I simply don’t have the time to commit to such an effort. You may take me at my word, or feel free to dig into the matter yourself. Since I am most acquainted with warfare in the ancient world, we will generally confine our discussion from the time of Alexander (336 BC) to the end of the Migration Period around 500 AD.

War was waged in the ancient world for innumerable reasons, but the objectives of war were nearly always the same. War in the ancient world was primarily about conquest. The aggressor sought to subdue an enemy tribe, nation, or people, not to eradicate them completely. I don’t think that the ancient world shied away from genocide, but it did not normally serve an aggressor’s best interest. It was far more simple to assume governance of a people than to kill them all. For one, it would be beyond most nation’s abilities to repopulate the newly emptied land with their own citizens; the populations of the world were simply too small. Since wars were focused on conquest, the subduction of an enemy to another’s will, death and destruction were not an end in and of themselves. They were useful only insofar as they subdued the enemy. Battles were fought to remove an enemy’s capacity to defend themselves. Once a group felt that they could not defend themselves, they sued for peace.

As wars were won by disheartening the enemy, so too were battles. Armies in the classical world utilized close formations of heavy infantry as their core, with cavalry and light infantry as accessories. The heavy infantrymen were well armored and bore weapons intended for melee combat. While fighting in formation, heavy infantry was extremely difficult to defeat. Rather than the scrum portrayed by Hollywood, most historians believe that battles involved multiple periods of clash and rest. Fighting is far too mentally and physically taxing to maintain for any great length of time, so the front lines would fight for some time before retreating to a safe distance to rest and gather their courage for another clash. Given this rather timid face of warfare, the heavy armor of many infantry, and the defensive benefits of a formation, casualties would have been very low when simply considering a clash between two forces of heavy infantry. It was therefore the objective an army to disrupt the formations of the enemy infantry. Heavy infantry was far easier to cut down when scattered and possibly retreating.

The role of light infantry was to disrupt the formation of the enemy by showering their lines with missiles and enticing them to break formation for a pursuit. Cavalry could pepper the enemy with missiles, entice the enemy to give chase, or charge into the melee themselves. Cavalry that charged into the infantry formation are called “shock” cavalry because of the fear they would induce in the infantrymen. These charges were ideally directed at the infantry’s flank or rear for maximum effect. Research suggests that a horse will not charge into a wall of men it cannot see through, so shock cavalry would have required the enemy formation to break before the horses came within fighting distance. Infantry may have been enticed to break formation from fear of the horses thundering toward them, or their lines may have been sufficiently thinned by missiles to allow the horses avenues to charge through. Battles were therefore a kind of high stakes game of “chicken”, where the first soldiers to break formation were killed by the hundreds.

One of the most essential elements of war in any period is the logistics. Armies must always be supplied with food, water, and arms. Troops often required regular payment as well. Poor or neglected logistics is the surest way to lose a war, as either the soldiers will leave of their own volition or be in an unfit state to fight. Among Hannibal Barca’s many skills was a genius for logistics that has never been matched. He managed to keep a rag-tag, multiethnic army supplied and in good fighting order while deep in enemy territory for years on end. Without good logistics, he would have never become the Scourge of Rome. For a negative example, let’s examine Napoleon’s famous failed invasion of Russia. Napoleon had relied on plundering the countryside during his wars in Europe, removing the need for a supply line and allowing his armies to travel at unparalleled speeds. When the Russians literally scorched the earth with flame as they retreated, Napoleon’s army had nothing to eat. He was forced to implement long supply lines that slowed his army enough that they were caught by the harsh Russian winter. His ill-supplied and unprepared soldiers died in droves because of poor logistics.

We’ve covered some broad strokes of military theory, but next week I’d like to get into the details of arms and armament. We’ll talk about how weapons were really used, and which ones were most effective. The following week, I’d like to discuss the tactics and formations of several historical groups, including the Romans, Greeks, and Celts. If there’s any specific you’d like me to cover, drop a suggestion in the comments.